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Abstract
In this paper, we deal with the problem of maximizing the profit of Network Operators (NOs)
of green cellular networks in situations where Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees must be
ensured to users, and Base Stations (BSs) can be shared among different operators.
We show that if NOs cooperate among them, by mutually sharing their users and BSs,
then each one of them can improve its net profit.
By using a game-theoretic framework, we study the problem of forming stable coalitions
among NOs. Furthermore, we propose a mathematical optimization model to allocate users
to a set of BSs, in order to reduce costs and, at the same time, to meet user QoS for NOs
inside the same coalition. Based on this, we propose an algorithm, based on cooperative
game theory, that enables each operator to decide with whom to cooperate in order to
maximize its profit.
This algorithms adopts a distributed approach in which each NO autonomously makes
its own decisions, and where the best solution arises without the need to synchronize them
or to resort to a trusted third party.
The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated through a thorough exper-
imental evaluation considering real-world traffic traces, and a set of realistic scenarios. The
results we obtain indicate that our algorithm allows a population of NOs to significantly
improve their profits thanks to the combination of energy reduction and satisfaction of QoS
requirements.
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1. Introduction
The increasing consumption of electrical energy is one of the most important issues
characterizing modern society because of its effects on climate changes and on the depletion
of non-renewable sources. In this scenario, the ICT sector plays a key role, being responsible
for about 10% of the world carbon footprint and electrical energy consumption [1, 2].
Reportedly [3, 4], within the ICT sector, the mobile telecommunication industry (and, in
particular, cellular networks) is one of the major contributors to energy consumption. This
has stimulated the interest towards a new research area called green cellular networks [5],
that aims at reducing the energy consumption of these communication infrastructures.
From the perspective of a cellular Network Operator (NO), the reduction of electrical
energy consumption is not only a matter of being “green” and responsible, but also an
economically important opportunity. As a matter of fact, it has been argued that nearly
half of the total operating expenses of a NO is due to energy costs [3, 4]. Furthermore, a
significant part of these costs are due to Base Stations (BSs) [6]: indeed, even in the case
of little or no activity, a BS can consume more than 90% of its peak energy [4, 7]. Thus, by
reducing energy consumption, a NO may sensibly increases its profit.
Consequently, a lot of research effort has been concentrated lately on the reduction of
the energy consumed by BSs. Techniques like the design of more energy-efficient hard-
ware equipments, or the use of new energy saving techniques (e.g., sleep modes [8] and cell
zooming [9]) to switch off under-utilized BSs during low traffic periods and to transfer the
corresponding load to neighboring cells, have been proposed as possible solutions.
Such techniques, however, must be applied with care so as to maintain Quality-of-Service
(QoS) guarantees agreed by a NO with its customers, whose violations imply monetary losses
for that NO. Specifically, since fewer transmission resources are available at a cell when such
energy-efficient techniques are used, bottlenecks may form for those users connected to that
cell, who may thus experience QoS levels lower than guaranteed, and in some cases may be
even unable to receive service at all. Finally, the use of techniques like cell zooming may
cause other problems, such as inter-cell interference and coverage holes [9].
In this paper, we argue that, if NOs cooperate among them by mutually sharing their
users and BSs, then each one of them can improve its net profit by either (a) reducing energy
costs by switching off its BSs and offloading its users to switched on BSs of other NOs, or
(b) increasing its earnings by attracting users from other NOs, or by relying on BSs of other
NOs to accept more users than what could do by working alone.
Obviously, it is unreasonable to expect that each NO is willing to unconditionally co-
operate with the other ones regardless the benefits it receives. Such a cooperation arises
indeed only if suitable benefits result from it, and if the risks of monetary losses are kept
within acceptable limits.
In this paper, we devise a decision algorithm that provides a set of NOs with suitable
means to decide whether to cooperate with other NOs, and if so with whom to cooperate.
Our algorithm is based on game-theoretic techniques, where the process of establishing
cooperation among the NOs is modeled as a cooperative game with transferable utility [10]
(in particular, as a hedonic game [11], whereby each NO bases its decision on its own
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preferences).
More specifically, we propose a game-theoretic framework to study the problem of forming
stable coalitions among NOs, and a mathematical optimization model to allocate users to a
set of BSs, in order to reduce costs and, at the same time, to meet user QoS for NOs inside
the same coalition. We achieve our goal by devising a hedonic shift algorithm to form stable
coalitions that allows each NO to autonomously and selfishly decide whether to leave the
current coalition to join a different one or not on the basis of the net profit it receives for
doing so.
In our approach, each NO pays for the energy consumed to serve each user, whether
it belongs to it or to another NO, but receives a payoff (computed as discussed later) for
doing so. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a Nash-stable set of disjoint
coalitions [12], whereby no NO can benefit to leave the current coalition to join a different
one.
Our solution adopts an asynchronous approach in which each NO autonomously makes
its own decisions, and where the best solution arises without the need to synchronize them
or to resort to a trusted third party. As a consequence, the solution we propose can be
readily implemented in a distributed fashion.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm we propose, we carry out a thorough
experimental evaluation considering real-world traffic traces, and a set of realistic scenar-
ios. The results we obtain indicate that our algorithm allows indeed a population of NOs
to significantly improve their profits thanks to the combination of energy reduction and
satisfaction of QoS requirements.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• we consider the problem of maximizing operators’ profit in green cellular networks;
• we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility;
• we devise a distributed algorithm enabling operators to find the coalition maximizing
their profits under stability concerns;
• we show its effectiveness through experimental analysis in realistic scenarios;
• we assess the impact of energy price and user population on the profits attained by
operators.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the system under
study and we present the problem addressed in this paper. In Section 3, we present the
cooperative game-theoretic framework we use to study the problem of coalition formation
and the hedonic shift algorithm we design to form stable coalitions. In Section 4, we show
results from an experimental evaluation to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
In Section 5, we provide an overview of related works. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude the
paper and present an outlook on possible future extensions.
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2. System Model and Problem Definition
2.1. System Model
We consider an area served by a set N = {1, . . . , N} of NOs, whose BSs fully cover that
area and whose coverage overlaps (as typically happens in urban areas [9, 13, 14]). To keep
the notation simple, we assume that in the area of interest there is only one BS per NO, so
in the rest of this paper, we will use the terms BS and NO interchangeably (the extension
of the model to support multiple BSs per NO is straightforward).
Each BS i is characterized by its maximum downlink transmission capacity Ci, and by
its power consumption Wi(ni) that, as argued in [7, 15, 16], is linearly dependent on the
number of users it is serving, that is:
Wi(ni) = αi + βini (1)
where αi (the static term) is the load-independent power consumption (which is usually
known from the specifications of the BS, and typically accounts for about 90% of the total
consumption [4, 7]), and βini (the dynamic term) is the load-dependent power consumption
(that can be determined by linear regression from real power measurements [16]).
Each NO i provides network connectivity to a set Ui of customers (hereafter also referred
to as users). Each user j ∈ Ui is characterized by its required QoS, quantified by the
minimum downlink data rate Dj it requests, and the actual downlink data rate dj it gets
from the network.
Each user j ∈ U (where U =
⋃N
i=1 Ui) can connect to any BS in the system regardless of
the NO who owns the BS (i.e., it can connect to a BS that belongs to the NO to which it
is subscribed or it can roam on the BS of another one). This can be accomplished by using
techniques like cell wilting and blossoming [17]. However, the aggregate allocated data rate
to users connected to BS i cannot exceed its capacity Ci, that is:∑
j∈Ui
dj ≤ Ci. (2)
We assume that the number of users receiving service from a BS i varies over time,
and is described by the load profile curve ℓi(t) of that BS that expresses, as function of
time, the percentage of the maximum number of users Mi that can receive service by BS i
when each user j is allocated its entire desired data rate Dj . It then follows that, if all the
users have the same data rate requirement (i.e., Dj = D for all j ∈ Ui), then Mi = Ci/D.
Conversely, if users are heterogeneous, then Mj is estimated as Mj = Ci/D¯, where D¯ is the
weighted average of the data rates requested by users, i.e., D¯ =
∑
j∈Ui
pjDj, where pj is the
probability that user j arrives at BS i.
An example of a typical daily load profile is depicted in Figure 1, where the x-axis
represents the time (in hours) and the y-axis is the normalized load of the BS [18]. For
instance, if at a given time t, Mi = 10 and ℓi(t) = 0.8, the number ni(t) of user of BS i at
time t is ni(t) = 0.8 · 10 = 8.
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Figure 1: A typical daily load profile ℓi(·) of a single BS i.
2.2. Problem Definition
Given the system characterized as above and a particular area of interest, each NO seeks
to maximize its net profit (i.e., the difference between its revenues and costs) in the presence
of a time-varying population of users in this area.
The net profit rate Pi of NO i (i.e., the profit it makes per unit of time) can be expressed
as
Pi =
∑
j∈Ui
Ri,j −
[
Wi(ni)Ei +
∑
j∈Ui
Li,j(dj)
]
(3)
where Ri,j is the revenue rate generated by user j on BS i, Ei is the electricity cost rate of
BS i, and Li,j(di) is the penalty rate incurred by NO i if user j receives a downlink rate dj
lower than its QoS value Dj , which is given by the following loss function:
Li,j(dj) =
(
1−
dj
Dj
)
Ri,j (4)
Thus, Li,j(di) is zero if the QoS of the user is completely satisfied (i.e., dj = Dj), and linearly
increases until Ri,j as the assigned data rate dj decreases (so that an NO gets no revenue
from those customers that receive no service).
If the NOs in the area of interest cooperate among them (i.e., they share their users and
BSs) then each NO i can maximize the corresponding value of Pi by acting on the various
terms of Eq. (3) as follows:
• it can attempt to reduce Wi(ni) by offloading (some of) its users to the BSs of other
operators so that its BS can be switched off entirely (by exploiting sleep modes [8]) or
only in part (by relying on cell zooming [9]);
• it can attempt to increase Ri,j either by attracting users from other NOs, so that it
can better amortize its energy costWi(ni), or by relying on BSs of other NOs to accept
users that, if working alone, it could not serve without violating Eq. (2), thus incurring
into a (possibly high) penalty rate Li,j .
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It is evident that, to exploit these opportunities, each NO must be willing to cooperate
with (at least some of) the other ones. In the following section, we will characterize the
conditions under which such a cooperation is not only possible, but also sought by these
NOs.
3. The Coalition Formation Game
As discussed before, cooperation is the key to increase profit. However, it is unreasonable
to assume that a NO is willing to unconditionally cooperate with the other ones regardless of
the benefits it receives. As a matter of fact, the acceptance of users roaming from other NOs
is beneficial only if the additional revenue they bring outweighs the costs and the possible
penalties they induce. Furthermore, the offloading of users to other NOs makes sense only
if a suitable revenue results from this operation for the off-loader.
To cooperate, a set of NOs must first form a coalition, i.e., they all must agree to share
their own BSs and users among them. Given a set of NOs, however, there can be many
different coalitions that can be formed, each one differing from the other ones in terms of the
structure (i.e., the identity of each member) and/or of the profit it brings to their members.
In order to join a coalition, a NO must indeed find it profitable, i.e., it must be sure that
the profit it earns by joining the coalition is no worse of the one it obtains by working alone.
Furthermore, in order to be sure that this profit is not ephemeral, a NO must seek other
properties that guarantee the suitability of a coalition, namely:
• Stability : a coalition is stable if none of its participants finds that it is more profitable
to leave it (e.g., to stay alone or to join another coalition) rather than cooperating
with the other ones. Lack of stability causes possible monetary losses for the following
reasons:
– a NO that has joined a coalition with the expectation of receiving users roaming
from other NOs is penalized if, after switching on a BS on which to accommodate
these users, these NOs leave the coalition;
– a NO that has accepted more users than those it can serve without incurring
into a penalty, expecting to use the BSs of other NOs to accommodate them, is
penalized if these NOs leave the coalition.
• Fairness : when joining a coalition, a NO expects that the resulting profits are fairly
divided among participants. As an unfair division leads to instability, a fair profit
allocation strategy is mandatory.
From these considerations, it clearly follows that a way must be provided to each NO to
decide whether to participate to a coalition or not and, if so, which one among all the
possible coalitions is worth joining.
In this paper, we address this issue by modeling the problem of coalition formation
as a coalition formation cooperative game with transferable utility [10, 19], where each NO
cooperates with the other ones in order to maximize its net profit rate, and by devising an
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algorithm to solve it. By using our algorithm, the various NOs can make their decisions
concerning coalition membership.
In the rest of this section, we first set the coalition formation problem in the game-
theoretic framework (Section 3.1), then we present an algorithm to form stable coalitions
among NOs (Section 3.2), and finally we present an optimization model to allocate users
to a set of BSs, in order to reduce costs and, at the same time, to meet user QoS for NOs
inside the same coalition (Section 3.3).
3.1. Characterization
Our coalition formation algorithm is based on a hedonic game [11], a class of coalition
formation cooperative games [10, 19] where each NO acts as a selfish agent and where its
preferences over coalitions depend only on the composition of that coalition. That is, NOs
prefer being in one coalition rather than in another one solely based on who else is in the
coalitions they belong.
Formally, given the set N = {1, 2, . . . , N} of NOs (henceforth also referred to as the
players), a coalition S ⊆ N represents an agreement among the NOs in S to act as a single
entity.
At any given time, the set of players is partitioned into a coalition partition Π, that we
define as the set Π = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sl}, where Sk ⊆ N (k = 1, . . . , l) is a disjoint coalition
such that
⋃l
k=1 Sk = N and Sj ∩ Sk = ∅ for j 6= k. Given a coalition partition Π, for any
NO i ∈ N , we denote as SΠ(i) the coalition to which i is participating.
Each coalition S is associated with its coalition value v(S), that we define as the net
profit rate of that coalition, that is:
v
(
S
)
= R
(
US
)
−Q
(
US
)
−K
(
S
)
(5)
where:
• R
(
US
)
is the coalition revenue rate, corresponding to the sum of revenue rates of
individual users j ∈ US (where US =
⋃
i∈S Ui is the joint user population of the NOs
belonging to S);
• Q
(
US
)
is the coalition load cost rate, and is computed by minimizing the costs resulting
from serving the users in US using all the resources provided by the NOs belonging to
S (we discuss this in Section 3.3);
• K(S) is the coalition formation cost rate, that takes into account the cost incurred by
players to establish and maintain the coalition (e.g., the costs for system reconfigura-
tion to enable user migration and handover across NOs). In this paper, we assume
K(S) to be proportional to the coalition size, and we define it as:
K(S) =
{∑
i∈S Ki, |S| > 1,
0, otherwise.
(6)
where Ki is the coalition formation cost rate for NO i.
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Obviously, each NO i ∈ S must receive a fraction xi(S) of the coalition value, that we call
the payoff of i in S. Our game is conceived in such a way to form coalitions in which NOs
get payoffs as high as possible, without violating the fairness requirement, so that stability
is achieved. Thus, a payoff allocation rule must be specified in order to compute the payoffs
of each coalition member in such a way to ensure fairness in the division of payoffs.
To this end, we use the Shapley value [20], a payoff allocation rule that is based on
the concept of marginal contribution of players (i.e., the change in the worth of a coalition
when a player joins to that coalition), such that the larger is the contribution provided by
a player to a coalition, the higher is the payoff allocated to it. 1 This means that, in a given
coalition, some “more-contributing” NOs will be rewarded by other “less-contributing” NOs
to encourage them to join the coalition. More specifically, the Shapley value φi(v) of player
i is defined as:
φi
(
v
)
=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!
(
N − |S| − 1
)
!
N !
(
v
(
S ∪ {i}
)
− v
(
S
))
(7)
where the sum is over all subsets S not containing i (the symbol “\” denotes the set difference
operator), and the symbol “!” denotes the factorial function.
It is worth noting that we rely on the Shapley value for its interesting properties. Never-
theless, other payoff allocation rules can be used and our work is general enough to support
them.
To set up the coalition formation process, we need to define, for each NO i, a preference
relation i that NO i can use to order and compare all the possible coalitions it may join.
Formally, this corresponds to define a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation over
the set of all coalitions that NO i can form (see [12]).
Specifically, for any NO i ∈ N and given S1,S2 ⊆ N , the notation S1 i S2 means that
NO i prefers being a member of S1 over S2 or at least i prefers both coalitions equally. In
our coalition formation game, for any NO i ∈ N , we use the following preference relation:
S1 i S2 ⇔ ui(S1) ≥ ui(S2), (8)
where S1,S2 ⊆ N are any two coalitions that contain NO i (i.e., i ∈ S1 and i ∈ S2), and ui
is a preference function defined for any NO i as follows:
ui(S) =
{
xi(S), S /∈ h(i),
−∞, otherwise.
(9)
where xi(S) is the payoff received by NO i in S by means of Eq. (7), and h(i) is a history
set where NO i stores the identity of the coalitions that have been already evaluated so that
we avoid generating twice the same candidate coalition (a similar idea for pruning already
considered coalitions has also been used in previously published work, such as in [22]).
1More specifically, we use the Aumann-Dre´ze value [21], which is an extension of the Shapley value for
games with coalition structures.
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Thus, according to Eq. (9), each NO prefers to join the coalition that provides the larger
payoff.
The strict counterpart of i, denoted by ≻i, is defined by replacing ≥ with > in Eq. (8),
and implies that i strictly prefers being a member of S1 over S2.
3.2. The Algorithm for Coalition Formation
In this section, we present an algorithm for coalition formation that allows the NOs to
take distributed decisions for selecting which coalitions to join at any point in time. This
algorithm is based on the following hedonic shift rule (see [22]):
Definition 1. Given a coalition partition Π = {S1, . . . ,Sh} on the set N and a preference
relation ≻i, any NO i ∈ N decides to leave its current coalition SΠ(i) = Sl, for 1 ≤ l ≤ h,
to join another one Sk ∈ Π ∪ ∅, with Sk 6= Sl, if and only if Sk ∪ {i} ≻i Sl, that is if
its payoff in the new coalition exceeds the one it is getting in its current coalition. Hence,
{Sl,Sk} → {Sl\{i},Sk ∪ {i}}.
This shift rule (that we denote as “→”) provides a mechanism through which any NO can
leave its current coalition SΠ(i) and join another coalition Sk, given that the new coalition
Sk ∪ {i} is strictly preferred over SΠ(i) through any preference relation that the NOs are
using. This rule can be seen as a selfish decision made by a NO to move from its current
coalition to a new one, regardless of the effects of this move on the other NOs.
Using the hedonic shift rule, we design a distributed hedonic coalition formation algo-
rithm for NOs as presented in Algorithm 1.
The basic idea of the algorithm is to have each NO i search, asynchronously with respect
to the other NOs, the state space of possible coalitions it may join, and for each one of them,
evaluate whether it is preferable (according to the corresponding ≻i relation) to remain in its
current coalition, or to join it. Whenever a NO decides to move from a coalition to another
one, it updates its history set h(i) by appending the coalition it is leaving, so that the same
coalition is not visited twice during the coalition space search. A NO iterates the actions
listed in Algorithm 1 until no more hedonic shift rules are possible. It is worth noting that
the asynchronicity of our algorithm makes it suitable to be executed, for instance, when new
users arrive to NOs, thus making it able to adapt to environmental changes.
Let us explain in detail how Algorithm 1 works. The algorithm takes as parameters the
global state state , storing the current shared coalition partition Πc, and the identity i of the
calling NO (initially there are no coalitions, i.e., Πc = Π0 =
{
{1}, {2}, . . . , {N}
}
).
At each execution of the algorithm, NO i initializes its history set h and other auxiliary
variables (lines 2–3), and then enters a loop that is executed until no more hedonic shift
rules can be performed from the last coalition partition considered by i.
In each loop iteration, NO i retrieves the current coalition partition, and generates all
the possible hedonic shifts until no more of them are possible. Given the distributed nature
of the algorithm, we postulate the use of suitable distributed space management algorithms
(e.g. [23, 24]).
Then, after acquiring a lock to gain exclusive access to the shared state (line 5) in order
to ensure its atomic update (by means of a suitable distributed mutual exclusion algorithm
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Algorithm 1 The Coalition Formation Algorithm for NOs
1: procedure CoalitionFormation(state , i)
2: h← ∅
3: Sbest ← ∅
4: repeat
5: Lock(state)
6: Πc ← GetCurrentPartition(state)
7: Scur ← SΠc(i)
8: Sbest ← Scur
9: for all S ∈
(
Πc \ {Scur}
)
∪ ∅ and S /∈ h do
10: Snew ← S ∪ {i}
11: xSbest ← ComputePayoff(Sbest, i) ⊲ See Eq. (5) and Eq. (7)
12: xSnew ← ComputePayoff(Snew, i) ⊲ See Eq. (5) and Eq. (7)
13: if xSnew > xSbest then ⊲ See Eq. (8) and Eq. (9)
14: Sbest ← Snew
15: end if
16: end for
17: if Sbest 6= Scur then
18: S ← Scur \ {i}
19: T ← Sbest \ {i}
20: UpdateHistory(h,S)
21: Πbest ←
(
Πc \ {Scur, T }
)
∪
{
S,Sbest
}
22: SetCurrentPartition(state ,Πbest)
23: end if
24: Unlock(state)
25: until Sbest = Scur
26: end procedure
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[23]), NO i iteratively evaluates all the possible coalitions it can form from its current
coalition partition, to look for the one with the higher payoff.
To do so, given its current coalition partition Πc, for each coalition Sk ∈ Πc ∪ ∅ (not
present in its history set and different from its current one SΠc(i)), NO i applies the hedonic
shift rule and evaluates its preference against the current coalition SΠc(i) (lines 9–16).
If a coalition Sk with the higher payoff is found (lines 17–23), NO i adds to its history
set h the coalition SΠc(i) \ {i} it is leaving, and updates the partition set by updating both
Sk (that now contains also i) and SΠc(i) (that now does not contain i anymore).
Then, after releasing the exclusive lock to the shared state (line 24), NO i repeats the
above steps (lines 5–24) to look for a better coalition, in case some other NO has meanwhile
modified the shared state by changing the coalition partition.
Eventually, if no other better coalition is found, NO i terminates the execution of the
algorithm (line 25), until a new instance is run again.
The convergence of the proposed algorithm during the hedonic coalition formation phase
is guaranteed as follows:
Proposition 1 (Convergence). Starting from any initial coalition structure Π0, the proposed
algorithm always converges to a final partition Πf .
Proof. The coalition formation phase can be mapped to a sequence of shift operations. That
is, according to the hedonic shift rule, every shift operation transforms the current partition
Πc into another partition Πc+1. Thus, starting from the initial step, the algorithm yields the
following transformations:
Π0 → Π1 → · · · → Πc → Πc+1 (10)
where the symbol “→” denotes the application of a shift operation. Every application of
the shift rule leads to a coalition partition that has not been previously visited (i.e., a new
coalition partition). Thus, the number of transformations performed by the shift rule is
finite (at most, it is equal to the number of partitions, that is the Bell number) and hence
the sequence in Eq. (10) will always terminate and converge to a final partition Πf .
The stability of the final partition Πf resulting from the convergence of the proposed
algorithm can be addressed by using the following stability definition (see [12] for details).
Definition 2. A coalition partition Π = {S1, . . . ,Sl} is Nash-stable if ∀i ∈ N , SΠ(i) i
Sk ∪ {i} for all Sk ∈ Π ∪ ∅.
It is worth noting that Nash-stability captures the notion of stability with respect to
movements of single NOs (i.e., no NO has an incentive to unilaterally deviate).
For the hedonic coalition formation phase of the proposed algorithm, we can prove the
following result:
Proposition 2 (Nash-stability). Any final partition Πf resulting from Algorithm 1 is Nash-
stable.
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Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Assume that the final partition Πf is not Nash-stable.
Consequently, there exists a NO i ∈ N and a coalition Sk ∈ Πf ∪ ∅ such that Sk ∪ {i} ≻i
SΠf (i). Then, NO i will perform a hedonic shift operation and hence Πf → Π
′
f , where Π
′
f is
the new coalition partition resulting after the hedonic shift operation. This contradicts the
assumption that Πf is the final outcome of our algorithm.
It is worth to point out that Nash-stability also implies the so called individual-stability [12].
A partition Π = {S1, . . . ,Sl} is individually-stable if it does not exist a NO i ∈ N and a
coalition Sk ∈ Π∪ ∅ such that Sk ∪ {i} ≻i SΠ(i) and Sk ∪ {i} j Sk for all j ∈ Sk, i.e., if no
NO can benefit by moving from its coalition to another existing (possibly empty) coalition
while not making the members of that coalition worse of. Thus, we can conclude that our
algorithm always converges to a partition Πf which is both Nash-stable and individually
stable.
Given the NP-completeness of the problem of finding a Nash-stable partition [25], the
computational cost of our algorithm can become quite large when the number of NOs in-
creases (indeed, in the worst case, it is bounded by the N th Bell number, where N is the
number of NOs). In these cases, we can reduce the computational cost by having each NO
check for the Nash-stability of its current coalition partition (this check takes polynomial
time [25]), and execute the algorithm only if Nash-stability no longer holds true.
3.3. Computation of the Optimal Coalition Load Cost
The algorithm presented in the previous section requires the computation of the value
v(S) of any coalition S that each NO i may possibly join, that in turn requires the com-
putations of coalition load cost rate Q(US) (see Eq. (5)). To compute Q(US), we need in
turn to determine, for the coalition S, the optimal data rate allocation (i.e., the allocation
of users that minimizes the costs of NOs).
To this end, we define a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) modeling the problem
of allocating a set US of users onto a set S of BSs so that the overall cost rates of NOs in
S are minimized. The resulting optimization model is shown in Figure 2, where we use the
same notation introduced in Section 2 (however, to ease readability, we denote with U the
user set, i.e., we drop the dependence from S).
In the optimization model we use the following decision variables:
• ui,j, which is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if user j is allocated to BS i;
• di,j, which is a real variable representing the downlink data rate allocated to user j by
BS i;
• bi, which is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if BS i is switched on.
The objective function Q
(
U
)
(see Eq. (11a)) represents the cost rates incurred by the coali-
tion of NOs for serving users in U , and is defined as the sum of the costs due to the power
absorbed by the BSs that are switched-on, and of those due to QoS violations (if any).
The resulting optimal user allocation is bound to the following constraints:
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minimize Q(U) =
∑
i∈S
[
biWi
(∑
j∈U
ui,j
)
Ei +
∑
j∈U
Li,j
(
di,j
)]
(11a)
subject to∑
j∈U
di,j ≤ Ci, i ∈ S, (11b)
∑
i∈S
ui,j = 1, j ∈ U , (11c)
∑
j∈U
ui,j ≤ biU, i ∈ S, (11d)
di,j ≤ ui,jDj, i ∈ S, j ∈ U , (11e)
di,j ∈ R
∗, i ∈ S, j ∈ U , (11f)
ui,j ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ S, j ∈ U , (11g)
bi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ S. (11h)
Figure 2: The user-to-BS allocation optimization model.
• Eq. (11b) ensures that the capacity of a switched-on BS is not exceeded;
• Eq. (11c) imposes that each user is served by exactly one BS;
• Eq. (11d) states that only BSs that are switched on can serve users; the purpose of
this constraint is to avoid that a user is served by a BS that will be switched off;
• Eq. (11e) imposes that each user obtains at most the requested data rate by the serving
BS;
• Eq. (11f), Eq. (11g), and Eq. (11h) define the domain of decision variables di,j, ui,j,
and bi, respectively.
As can be noted from the definition of Q
(
U
)
, the solution of the optimization problem
at a specif instant of time requires the knowledge of the number of users present in each BS
i at that time. In general, however, such number is not constant, but it varies over time
according to the corresponding load profile ℓi(t).
In order to compute the number of users of BS i at time t from ℓi, we proceed as follows:
first, as typically done in the literature [26, 27], we discretize ℓi(t) by splitting the time
axis into uniform disjoint sub-intervals [τ, τ + ∆t) of length ∆t time units (where ∆t is
the discretization step). Then, we approximate the (normalized) load of each subinterval
as a constant value set to the peak load of that subinterval. For instance, the result of
the discretization of the load profile of Figure 1 with ∆t of 1 hour is depicted in Figure 3.
In this figure, the time-horizon of one day (i.e., 24 hours) is split into several subintervals
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Figure 3: Discretization of the load profile of Figure 1 with a time-horizon of 1 day and ∆t = 1 hour (vertical
segments represent subintervals bounds and horizontal segments are peaks inside subintervals).
[τ, τ + ∆t) of length ∆t = 1 hour, where τ = 0, 1, . . . , 23. Each subinterval is delimited
by vertical dotted segments, while every horizontal solid red segment is the peak inside
each subinterval, that we will use as an approximation of the (normalized) load inside the
subinterval.
4. Experimental Evaluation
In order to assess the ability of our algorithm of increasing the net profits for a population
of NOs, we perform a set of experiments in which we consider a variety of realistic scenarios
and real-world traffic data. In these experiments we vary, in a controlled way, various input
parameters of the algorithm, namely the cost of energy, the QoS requirements of users, and
the discretization step of the traffic profile curve, so that we are able to assess the impact
of each one of them on the performance of the algorithm. The results we collect, discussed
in this section, demonstrate the ability of our algorithm of yielding significant increases of
the net profit achieved by a set of NOs in all the scenarios we consider.
To perform such experiments, we develop an ad-hoc simulator written in C++ and inter-
faced with CPLEX [28] to solve the various instances of the optimization model presented
in Section 3.3.
4.1. Experimental Setup
We consider a system configuration comprising five NOs, each one owning a single BS.
Without loss of generality, we assume that all the BSs are identical in terms of capacity
and energy consumption. More specifically, we set Ci = 100 Mbps, αi = 0.551 kW, and
βi = 0.00146 kW for i = {1, . . . , 5} (these last two values have been taken from [16]).
We also assume that all NOs incur in the same coalition cost rate, i.e., Ki = 0.01 $/hour
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
Furthermore, we assume that each BS has its own load profile, that differs from those
of the other ones. The load profiles we consider in our experiments, reported in Figs. 4a–
4e, have been obtained from real-world data [29] consisting of normalized cellular traffic
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(a) Traffic load curve for BS 1
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(b) Traffic load curve for BS 2
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(c) Traffic load curve for BS 3
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(d) Traffic load curve for BS 4
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(e) Traffic load curve for BS 5
Figure 4: Traffic load curves for the BSs of the experimental scenarios.
collected, with a resolution of 30 minutes, in a metropolitan urban area during one week,
and been already used in similar studies [13, 30]. Specifically, each load profile curve ℓi(·)
of Figure 4 has been obtained by fitting a periodic cubic spline to the traffic data related
to BS i. We characterize each load profile by computing the overall load during the entire
week as Γi =
∫ 168
0
li(t) dt, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, as well as the average hourly load as ℓ¯i = Γi/168,
that are reported in Table 1 (the upper integration limit corresponds to the number of hours
corresponding in a week).
4.2. Experimental Results
To evaluate the performance of our algorithm, we compute the relative net profit incre-
ment RP i attained by each NO i, that is defined as:
RP i =
A∑
k=1
xi(S
(k))
P
(k)
i
− 1
where A = ⌈168/∆t⌉ is the number of executions of the algorithm, while xi(S(k)) and P
(k)
i
correspond to the payoff received by NO i at the k-th algorithm execution and the profit it
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Table 1: Load characteristics of each BS i ∈ N .
BS Γi ℓ¯i
1 53.07 0.316
2 37.17 0.221
3 23.95 0.143
4 40.26 0.240
5 36.59 0.218
would attain if it worked alone (computed as in Eq. (3)), respectively. Note that, in general,
several Nash-stable coalitions may result at each algorithm execution; in these cases, xi(S(k))
is computed as the average of the payoffs yielded by all the Nash-stable coalitions that may
form.
To explain the results, we also compute, for each NO i, two additional quantities, namely:
• ON i, the ratio of the number of times that BS i is switched on after an execution of
the algorithm over the total number of algorithm executions;
• XLi, the difference between the ratio of the total number of users served by BS i when
working in a coalition over the total number of users it would serve if it was working
alone, and 1; this quantity corresponds to the relative deviation of load experienced
by BS i with respect to the case it works alone, where a positive (negative) value
represents an increment (decrement) of load with respect to the case of working alone.
In the rest of this section, we discuss the impact of the electricity price first (Sec-
tion 4.2.1), then we consider the effects of the heterogeneity of user requirements (Sec-
tion 4.2.2), then we evaluate the impact of the discretization step width (Section 4.2.3), and
finally we conclude with a discussion of our findings (Section 4.2.4).
4.2.1. Impact of Energy Costs
The energy cost Ei obviously impacts on the net profit achieved by an NO i. Intuitively,
if energy is expensive, NO i may find it profitable to offload its users to other NOs, so that
it can switch off its BS. Conversely, if energy is inexpensive, it may try to attract users from
other NOs.
To quantify the effects of energy price on the net profits achieved by NOs, we carry out
experiments on a set of scenarios obtained by setting Ei to either Elo = 0.12 $/kWh (which
is a typical value of electricity cost in the US [31]) or Ehi = 2 · Elo = 0.24 $/kWh. Because
of space constraints, we discuss only the results corresponding to four of the 32 (i.e., 25)
distinct scenarios resulting from the assignment of each cost value to each one of the NOs,
as indicated in Table 2.
These four scenarios have been selected since they can be considered representative of two
opposite situations that may occur in practice: the first two scenarios (1 and 2) correspond
indeed to standard situations where all BSs, being located in the same urban area, pay the
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Table 2: Electricity cost in the selected experimental scenarios.
Scenario Electricity Cost ($/kWh)
NO 1 NO 2 NO 3 NO 4 NO 5
1 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
3 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.12
4 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.24
Table 3: Impact of energy price: net profit increments of the various NOs.
Scenario Net Profit Increment (%)
NO 1 NO 2 NO 3 NO 4 NO 5
1 12.10 22.58 40.78 18.15 20.67
2 39.78 101.56 481.44 72.33 90.03
3 15.31 106.52 504.60 24.41 28.37
4 15.18 30.11 57.08 77.14 96.24
same energy price, while the last two scenarios (3 and 4) correspond to possible near-future
scenarios where different BSs can draw energy produced by either fossil fuel or renewable
sources [5] and, as such, pay different prices. In these scenarios, all users require the same
minimum downlink bandwidth (i.e., Dj = 10 Mbps) and generate the same revenue rate
Rj = 0.07 $/hour (this value is based on the 1 GB/month Share-Everything plan from
Verizon Wireless [32]). Furthermore, we assume that each NO executes an instance of
Algorithm 1 at every hour (i.e., ∆t = 1 hour).
Table 3 shows the net profit increment RPi for each NO i, while Table 4 shows the
corresponding ONi and XLi values.
Let us start with scenarios 1 and 2. As can be seen from the corresponding rows in
Table 3, NO 1 and NO 3 achieve the lowest and the highest net profit increase, respectively,
in both scenarios. The corresponding ON i and XLi values provide an explanation of these
facts. Indeed, while NO 3 is able to switch off its BS most of the times (ON 3 is no larger
than 26%), thus reducing its energy cost, NO 1 keeps it switched on for 90% of the times or
more, thus incurring into an high energy cost. This, in turn, is due to the characteristics of
the respective load profiles: while NO 1 most of the times has too many clients to be able
to offload all of them to other NOs, NO 3 is in the opposite situation. As a consequence,
NO 1 is able to accept users coming from other NOs (XL1 is larger than 60%), but the
extra revenues they generate is in large part elided by its energy costs. Finally, the profit
Table 4: Impact of energy price: ON and XL values (in %) for the various NO.
Scenario NO 1 NO 2 NO 3 NO 4 NO 5
ON 1 XL1 ON 2 XL2 ON 3 XL3 ON 4 XL4 ON 5 XL5
1 92.48 60.44 46.85 33.45 19.79 −30.96 22.03 −47.55 22.70 −42.04
2 90.60 60.43 42.84 26.00 25.89 −9.80 14.02 −63.85 23.38 −32.16
3 89.88 62.45 8.63 −84.90 9.52 −75.98 41.67 13.41 50.00 35.47
4 94.05 76.82 39.29 23.78 48.21 56.80 13.99 −75.27 5.65 −87.18
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Table 5: Minimum downlink data rates and revenue rates for the different user classes.
User Class Dj (Mbps) Traffic Type Rj ($/hour)
Base 0.0122 Voice 0.0175
Standard 0.384 3GPP 0.035
Premium 10 HSPA 0.07
Table 6: Impact of user heterogeneity: net profit increments of the varios NOs.
Scenario Net Profit Increment (%)
NO 1 NO 2 NO 3 NO 4 NO 5
1 6.23 10.96 19.84 9.46 10.77
2 16.90 33.94 78.29 28.02 33.82
3 7.95 36.06 81.43 12.48 14.84
4 7.88 14.65 28.36 30.11 36.05
increments of the other NOs (namely, 2, 4, and 5) fall in between the above two extremes:
they are indeed able to offload their users more often than NO 1 (they have a lower load),
but not as often as NO 3 (their load is higher), as indicated by Table 4.
This phenomenon occurs also in scenarios 3 and 4, where we observe that the largest net
profit increases are achieved by the NOs that are associated with the highest energy costs
(NOs 2 and 3 in scenario 3, and NO 4 and 5 in scenario 4). As indicated by Table 4, these
NOs are indeed often able to offload all their users to other BSs (such a frequency depends
on the respective load profiles) so that they can frequently switch off their BSs, and the cost
savings they achieve are significant given their higher energy costs. Again, as in scenarios
1 and 2, NO 1 gets the lower profit increase, since its ability to switch its BS off remains
lower than the other players.
4.2.2. Impact of User Heterogeneity
In the previous set of experiments, all the users were assumed to request the same
minimum downlink data rate. However, in realistic settings, it is reasonable to expect that
users with different requirements and revenues co-exist in the same area.
In order to study the impact of the composition of the user population on the ability of
our algorithm to yield satisfactory results, we carry out a set of experiments in which, for
each one of the scenarios listed in Table 2, users are partitioned in equal proportions into
three classes, each one characterized by a different values of the minimum downlink data
rate and revenue rate (as reported in Table 5). As in Section 4.2.1, we assume that each
NO executes an instance of Algorithm 1 at every hour (i.e., ∆t = 1 hour).
Table 6 shows the net profit increment RPi for each NO i. As for the case of homogeneous
users, we observe that in scenarios 1 and 2, the lowest and the highest net profit increases
are achieved by NO 1 (i.e., the NO with the heaviest loaded BS) and NO 3 (i.e., the NO
with the lightest loaded BS), respectively, while, in scenarios 3 and 4, the largest net profit
increments are reached by the NOs that are associated with the highest energy costs (i.e.,
NOs 2 and 3 in scenario 3, and NOs 4 and 5 in scenario 4). The explanation of this fact is
the same given for the homogeneous users case, so we do not repeat it here.
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Figure 5: Impact of ∆t: RP values for the various NOs and for ∆t = 1, 2, 4, 6.
Furthermore, while the composition of user population has no appreciable effects on the
choices taken by individual NOs, it has an evident effect on the net profit increase attained
by each NO. As can be indeed seen from Table 6, the RP values are lower than those achieved
by each NO in the same scenario when users are homogeneous (reported in Table 3). This is
not unexpected, given the lower average revenue rate brought by each user (0.0356 $/hour
versus 0.07 $/hour). However, we also note that these increases remain significant.
4.2.3. Impact of ∆t
The final set of results we comment are concerned with the behavior of the algorithm
when the discretization step ∆t increases, i.e., when its frequency of activation decreases.
This parameter has an evident impact on the solutions computed by the algorithm, since
the larger its value, the coarser the approximation of the load value used to compute the
optimal coalition load cost Q(·), and the lower the impact of the coalition formation cost
K(·).
To quantify this impact, we run several experiments in which we progressively increase
∆t. Because of space constraints, here we discuss only the results obtained for ∆t = 2, 4, 6
hours for the same scenarios and user population considered in Section 4.2.1, that are re-
ported in Figure 5. The figure shows for each value of ∆t (in the x-axis) the corresponding
RP values of the various NOs (denoted as RP(∆t), in the y-axis). Also, for the sake of
comparability, in the same figure, we report the RP values obtained for ∆t = 1 hour.
As can be seen from Figure 5, the larger ∆t, the lower the net profit increase attained
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by each NO for a given scenario with respect to when ∆t = 1.
As previously pointed out for the case of ∆t = 1, the energy cost plays an important role
in the achieved net profit increments. This still holds for larger value of ∆t since, as can
be noted in Figure 5, the decrease of the RP values, for increasing values of ∆t, is as much
larger as the higher is the energy cost. For instance, this can be observed by comparing
the RP values obtained in scenarios 1 (see Figure 5a) and 2 (see Figure 5b), whereby the
electricity cost double. Here, we can note that as ∆t increases, the RP values drops by a
factor of about 2 in scenario 1, and by a factor of nearly 2.5 but that can reach a factor of
about 4.8 for NO 3, in scenario 2. A similar situation happens in scenarios 3 and 4, where
the NOs that experience the higher decrease of their RP values are the ones with associated
the higher electricity cost, namely NOs 2 and 3 in scenario 3 (see Figure 5c) and NOs 4 and
5 in scenario 4 (see Figure 5d).
4.2.4. Discussion
From the results obtained in the experimental evaluation we can conclude that:
• energy costs greatly influence the coalition formation and the net profit increments
achieved by NOs;
• NOs with higher energy costs are more motivated to join a coalition since they can
offload their users to NOs with lower energy costs, thus allowing to switch off their
BSs and hence to achieve a higher net profit increment;
• NOs with heavier load are motivated to join a coalition as well, since they can host
users of other NOs, thus amortizing their energy costs;
• the composition of user population has no effect on the choices made by the various
NOs, while – if the revenue associated with each user is directly proportional to its
minimum downlink data rate – it has a strong impact on the net profit increment;
• the discretization step ∆t has a significant impact on the coalition formation process,
as the larger its value, the lower the net profit increment;
• when choosing the discretization step ∆t, one have to also take into account the impact
of the energy cost as, the larger is ∆t the higher is the (negative) impact of the energy
cost on the achieved net profit increment.
5. Related Works
The problem of increasing the profit of NOs in cellular wireless networks has been already
studied in the literature, where several papers on this topic have been published.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the problem of forming multiple stable coalitions
of BSs, in order to reduce energy consumption and to increase the profit of different and
selfish NOs, has never been tackled before. In our work, we pursue this problem by proposing
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a novel approach based on mathematical optimization and on the coalition formation game
theory.
Much of current research focuses indeed on energy saving techniques as a way to reduce
NO costs [5]. For instance, works like [33, 34, 35, 36] use optimization techniques and traffic
profile patterns to determine when and where to switch off BSs, while those like [9] use
cell-zooming techniques to adaptively adjust the cell size according to traffic load and to
possibly switch off inactive cells. Other works, like [37], focus on techniques to improve
spectrum efficiency in order to enhance the utilization of data subcarriers and thus to better
amortize the license costs of frequency bands. These techniques, however, do not consider
the cooperation among different NOs, and therefore are unable, unlike our approach, to
exploit the advantages brought by such a cooperation. Furthermore, they do not jointly
tackle the problems of ensuring QoS to users and of reducing energy consumption.
Approaches attempting to jointly achieve QoS and energy savings have been recently
proposed [27, 38, 39, 40].
In [27], a static joint planning and management optimization approach to limit energy
consumption (by switching BSs on and off according to the traffic load) while guaranteeing
QoS and minimizing NO costs is proposed. This approach, however, is inherently static
(it operates at network design time) so, unlike ours, is unable to operate in a dynamic
environment.
In [38], the authors present a cooperative game-theoretic approach, in which individual
access networks with insufficient resources join to form the grand-coalition in order to satisfy
service demands. This proposal is unable to support non trivial scenarios featuring multiple
NOs, a time-varying number of connected users, the energy consumption and the costs due
to coalition formation and operation, that may prevent the formation of the grand coalition
in favor of smaller and more stable coalitions. Conversely, these scenarios are properly dealt
with by our work.
In [39], a game-theoretic approach for the energy-efficient operation of heterogeneous
LTE cellular networks, belonging to a single NO, is proposed. This approach, however,
does not guarantee the stability of the coalitions that are formed, while stability is a core
property of our solution. Furthermore, it is unable to deal with complex scenarios featuring
multiple NOs possibly exhibiting different energy prices, and a time-varying population of
users. In contrast, our algorithm is able to deal with the above scenarios, and always yield
stable coalitions.
In [40], the authors propose a hierarchical dynamic game framework to increase the
capacity of two-tier cellular networks by offloading traffic from macro cells to small cells.
This work does not take into account the opportunity to selectively switch off underutilized
BSs thus offloading the related users to the remaining switched-on BSs. Therefore, our
approach can be considered complementary to this one, as it is able to provide a profitable
way to select what macro cells to consider before applying the proposed hierarchical game.
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6. Conclusion and Future Works
This paper presents a novel dynamic cooperation scheme among a group of cellular NOs
to achieve profit maximization. We propose a cooperative game-theoretic framework to
study the problem of forming stable coalitions among NOs, and a mathematical optimization
model to allocate users to a set of BSs, in order to reduce NO costs and, at the same time,
to meet user QoS.
Our solution adopts a distributed approach in which the best solution arises without the
need to synchronize the various NOs or to resort to a trusted third party, and such that no
NO can benefit by moving from its coalition to another (possibly empty) one.
In the proposed scheme, we model the cooperation among the NOs as a coalition game
with transferable utility and we devise a hedonic shift algorithm to form stable coalitions.
With our algorithm, each NO autonomously and selfishly decides whether to leave the cur-
rent coalition to join a different one according to his preference, meanwhile improving its
perceived net profit. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a Nash-stable
partition which determines the resulting coalition structure. Our algorithm can be read-
ily implemented in a distributed fashion, given that each NO can act independently and
asynchronously from any other NO in the system. Furthermore, the asynchronicity of our
algorithm makes it able to adapt to environmental changes (like new user arrivals).
To prove the effectiveness of our approach, we perform a thorough numerical evaluation
by means of trace-based simulation, using realistic scenarios and real-world traffic data. To
evaluate the performance of our algorithms, we vary, in a controlled way, the values of its
input parameters, like the energy cost and the user heterogeneity.
The future developments of this research is following several directions. Firstly, we want
to extend our work to include cellular networks sparsely deployed in wider geographical
areas. To do so, we will have to take into account several issues, like the network coverage
problem, whereby a BS can be switched off only if a group of neighboring BSs can cover the
area it serves.
As as second research direction, we want to explore different variants of our algorithm,
especially suited for large cellular networks. Specifically, when the number of BSs increases,
the time to convergence of our algorithm may be too long for practical uses, especially for
small values of the discretization step. In these cases, it would be better to renounce to the
quality of the obtained solution in favor of a more readily available solution. Our current
algorithm always provides the best solution (i.e., a Nash-stable partition), but at the cost of
visiting, in the worst case, all possible coalitions. To this end, we want to design an anytime
version of our algorithm (i.e., an algorithm which can return a – possibly suboptimal –
solution any time) and we want to compare its performance with the current one.
Finally, we would like to extend our work to include the cooperation between BSs and
their users, in order to improve the energy reduction of BSs and the quality of experience
of connected users.
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